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Abstract 
We study theoretically how the adjustment to liberalization of international financial 
transaction depends upon the degree of domestic financial development. Using a model with 
domestic and international borrowing constraints, we show that, when the domestic financial 
system is underdeveloped, capital account liberalization is not necessarily beneficial because 
TFP stagnates in the long-run or employment decreases in the short-run. Government policy, 
including allowing foreign direct investment, can mitigate the possible loss of employment, 
but cannot eliminate it unless the domestic financial system is improved. 
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"Capital account liberalization, it is fair to say, remains one of the most controversial
and least understood policies of our day". (Eichengreen, 2002)
This paper is a theoretical study into how an economy adjusts to the liberaliza-
tion of international ￿nancial transaction ￿capital account liberalization. Although
most economists agree that trade liberalization generally improves e¢ ciency of resource
allocation, they are sharply divided on the costs and bene￿ts of capital account lib-
eralization. According to standard microeconomic theory, the international ￿nancial
transaction is international trade of goods in di⁄erent dates (possibly contingent on the
states of nature), and thus capital account liberalization should have similar bene￿ts
with trade liberalization. Why do economists disagree? We think that the intertempo-
ral exchange of present goods and claims to future goods is fundamentally di⁄erent from
intra-temporal exchange of di⁄erent goods at least in one respect: the intertemporal
exchange requires the commitment that agents will provide goods (or their purchasing
power) in the future, while intra-temporal exchange does not require such commitment.1
If people￿ s ability to keep their promises is limited, then the equivalence of intertempo-
ral trade and intra-temporal trade no longer holds, and thus we need to investigate the
e⁄ects of capital account liberalization taking into account the limitation of commitment.
In this paper, we consider an economy in which the debtor does not keep his promise
to repay unless debt is secured by collateralizable assets ￿assets he looses if he defaults.
Then, the creditor limits her loan to the debtor so that the debt repayment does not
exceed the value of collateral. Moreover, we consider the case in which the amount of
1Of course, international trade requires some commitment because the order, delivery, payment and
consumption of goods are not simultaneous. But, the degree of commitment is usually more demanding
for international borrowing than trade.
1collateralizable assets for foreign credits is more restricted than for domestic credits,
because foreign creditors have more di¢ culty in taking over control and utilizing the
collateral assets in a di⁄erent country. The extent of assets usable for collateral depends
upon both technology and quality of institution of the economy which a⁄ects the devel-
opment of ￿nancial system. The extent of collateralizable assets for domestic borrowing
a⁄ects the overall ￿nancial depth of the economy. The gap between collateralizable
assets for international borrowing and domestic borrowing ￿the relative tightness of
international borrowing ￿a⁄ects how much the home economy is ￿nancially integrated
into the international ￿nancial market. Our aim is to examine how the adjustment of
the home economy to capital account liberalization depends upon the parameters of
￿nancial depth of the domestic economy and the relative tightness of the international
borrowing constraint.
For this purpose, we construct a dynamic model of a small open economy with entre-
preneurs and workers. At each date, some entrepreneurs are productive and others are
not. Entrepreneurs hire workers to produce output in the following period, and they can
borrow domestically against a fraction of future output. The fraction they can borrow
from foreigners is smaller. When domestic ￿nancial system is underdeveloped, it fails to
transfer enough purchasing power from savers (typically unproductive entrepreneurs) to
investing agents (productive entrepreneurs), so that the unproductive entrepreneurs end
up hiring workers. The productive entrepreneurs are credit constrained, the domestic
interest rate to the savers remains low (symptom of interest rate suppression), and the
total factor productivity (TFP) is low, which leads to low a wage rate (symptom of wage
suppression).2
2Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Kiyotaki (1998), Aghion, Banerjee and Piketty (1999), and Aghion and
Banerjee (2005), for examples, investigate these symptoms of the borrowing constrained economy.
2The way the economy adjusts to capital account liberalization depends upon the
relative strength of wage suppression versus interest rate suppression. If the wage-
suppression e⁄ect dominates the interest rate suppression, then even unproductive en-
trepreneurs may enjoy a higher rate of return on production than the foreign real interest
rate before liberalization. Following capital account liberalization, both productive and
unproductive entrepreneurs borrow from foreigners, causing capital in￿ ow, which pushes
up the wage rate. But the size and duration of the capital in￿ ow are limited due to the
poor domestic ￿nancial system, and TFP may deteriorate after liberalization.
If the interest rate suppression e⁄ect dominates the wage-suppression, then the do-
mestic real interest rate faced by the savers (unproductive entrepreneurs) under ￿nancial
autarky is lower than the foreign interest rate. Following capital account liberalization,
they start lending abroad and reduce their production. With capital out￿ ows, workers
su⁄er from wage reduction and loss of employment until unproductive entrepreneurs stop
producing. Here, capital account liberalization serves as a catalyst to reduce ine¢ cient
production by providing an alternative means of saving, improving TFP over time.
If domestic ￿nancial system is more advanced than the rest of the world, the produc-
tive entrepreneurial sector has enough borrowing capacity to absorb the domestic saving
so that the domestic interest rate under autarky is higher than the world interest rate.
After liberalization, the productive domestic entrepreneurs will attract foreign funds,
causing capital in￿ ow and higher investment. With a superior ￿nancial institution, the
domestic economy can take advantage of cheaper funds possibly induced by ￿nancial
suppression of the rest of the world.
What emerges from our analysis is that the adjustment of home economy to capital
account liberalization depends not only on the absolute level of development of home
￿nancial system, but also on the relative level of development of home institutions com-
3pared to the rest of the world.
Since capital account liberalization under poor domestic ￿nancial system leads to a
costly adjustment for workers under ￿nancial suppression, a natural step would be to
examine the role of government policy. When agents￿commitment is limited, tax liability
a⁄ects their capacity to borrow. For the economy under ￿nancial suppression, a subsidy
to production of unproductive entrepreneurs mitigates the loss of the workers following
capital liberalization at the cost of prolonging the transition to e¢ cient production.
Allowing foreign direct investment (FDI), which is considered as a more stable source
of employment compared with private ￿nancial in￿ ows, cannot eliminate workers￿loss
unless it helps to improve domestic technology and ￿nancial institutions.
There is an extensive literature that examines theoretically the relationship between
domestic ￿nancial development and capital account liberalization. Aghion, Bacchetta
and Banerjee (2004) show that an economy with an intermediate level of ￿nancial de-
velopment may become unstable following capital account liberalization. Caballero and
Krishnamurthy (2004) emphasize the interaction between domestic and international
￿nancial constraints in explaining the vulnerability of an economy to a ￿nancial crisis.
Kim (2001) develops a two-country model of adoption of vintages of technologies, and
shows that, following capital liberalization, the country with better domestic ￿nancial
system specializes in adopting more recent technology, while the country with poor ￿-
nancial system ends up with adopting older technologies, leading to a substantial gap in
the TFP between the two.
Concerning the direction of capital ￿ ows, Gertler and Rogo⁄(1990) propose a frame-
work in which capital can ￿ ow from the poor South to the richer North in a context
of a model of international lending under moral hazard. Recent contributions by Ca-
ballero, Fahri and Gourinchas (2006) emphasize the di⁄erent ￿nancial development and
4di⁄erent supply of means of saving, while Mendoza, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2007) focus
on the di⁄erent precautionary saving as determinants for the current pattern of global
imbalances across countries.3,4
While our analysis shares some of the aforementioned features, our distinctive con-
tribution to the literature is to investigate the implications of limited commitment of
private agents against both domestic and foreign creditors, for the entire adjustment
process of the economy following capital account liberalization. In particular we em-
phasize the endogenous adjustment of TFP, pointing out to the existence of a certain
threshold in terms of domestic ￿nancial development above which a country could bene￿t
from a process of capital account liberalization.
3There is a vast empirical literature that has examined the e⁄ects of capital account liberalization.
For an example, Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) analyzes the evolution of international ￿nancial integration
from the late 19th century. Kose, Prasad, Rogo⁄ and Wei (2008) summarizes previous studies of post
WWII. experiences to conclude that there is no robust relationship between capital account liberalization
and economics growth.
In a subsequent work Kose, Prasad and Taylor (2009) ￿nd evidence of threshold e⁄ects of capital
account liberalization on growth in terms of domestic ￿nancial developement. By using the ratio of
private credit to GDP as a proxy for ￿nancial depth, they ￿nd that greater ￿nancial depth leads to an
improvement in the growth e⁄ects of ￿nancial liberalization but only up to a certain level of ￿nancial
depth.
Also, Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2008) provide a comprehensive empirical analysis on the link
between ￿nancial integration and TFP (see also Bon￿glioli (2008) on this). Interestingly they ￿nd that
the composition of the underlying capital ￿ ows is crucial for understanding the link between ￿nancial
integration and TFP growth. Indeed liberalization of FDI and equity tends to improve TFP while that
of external debt liabilities does not (at least for poorly developed domestic ￿nancial system).
4In a di⁄erent strand of literature, Kehoe and Perri (2001, 2004) consider implications of enforcement
constraint between sovereign nations while abstracting from that between private agents. Jeske (2006)
and Wright (2006) examine the problem of resident default risk and the implication for government
intervention on capital ￿ ows.
52 Model
2.1 Framework
We consider a small open economy with one homogeneous goods and two types of con-
tinua of in￿nitely-lived agents: entrepreneurs and workers. Entrepreneurs hire workers
to produce goods. Workers do not have production technology, simply supplying homo-
geneous labor in order to consume.








; 0 < ￿ < 1; (1)
where cs is the consumption at date s; and Et is the expectations conditional on in-
formation at date t. The entrepreneurs have a constant returns to scale production
technology
yt+1 = atlt; (2)
where yt+1 is output at date t + 1, lt is labor input at date t, and at is a productivity
parameter which is known at date t. At each date some entrepreneurs are produc-
tive (at = ￿); and the others are unproductive (at = ￿ 2 (0;￿)). Each entrepreneur
shifts stochastically between productive and unproductive states following a Markov
process. Speci￿cally, if an entrepreneur is productive in this period he/she may become
unproductive in the next period with probability ￿; an unproductive entrepreneur in
this period may become productive in the next period with probability n￿: The shifts
of the productivity are exogenous and independent across entrepreneurs and over time.
This transition matrix implies that the fraction of productive entrepreneurs is stationary
over time and equal to n=(1 + n), given that the economy starts with such population
6distribution. We assume that the probability of the productivity shifts is not too large:
￿ + n￿ < 1: (3)
This assumption implies that the productivity of each agent is positively serially corre-
lated.
We assume that the production technology is speci￿c to the entrepreneur, and that
only the entrepreneur who started the production has the necessary skill to obtain full
amount described by the production function. We also assume that the entrepreneur
cannot precommit to work, always having freedom to withdraw her/his labor. (The
entrepreneur￿ s human capital is inalienable, following Hart and Moore (1994)). Besides
the entrepreneur, a lead creditor who has been monitoring the production throughout
has a speci￿c skill to obtain ￿ (< 1) fraction of full amount of output, if she takes over
the entrepreneur￿ s production. Although production is divisible, we assume that there
is only one lead creditor for each segment of production, and that only a home resident
can be a lead creditor. All the other (non-lead) outside creditors, home or foreign,
can obtain only ￿￿ fraction of full output, where ￿ 2 [0;1). Knowing this possibility
in advance, the foreign lenders restrict their loan of this period so that the repayment
(b￿
t+1) does not exceed ￿￿ fraction of output in the next period5:
5 Here, we apply Hart and Moore (1994) and Aghion, Hart and Moore (1992) on default and
renegotiation between private parties. We assume the outside creditors have weak bargaining power
against the producer and the lead creditor in the renegotiation, (even though the outside creditors
are made to be senior creditors in order to maximize borrowing from them). Unlike Bronner-Martin-
Ventura (2006) in which there are many domestic creditors who can correct a large fraction of returns,
we have only one monopolistic domestic lead creditor for each project. Then the lead creditor pays
the outside creditors ￿￿ fraction of full output in order to acquire the outside creditors￿right to the
project as senior creditors. When the lead creditor and the producer-debtor negotiate after the outside
creditors leave, we assume the producer has all the bargaining power. Then, after the producer pays ￿
fraction of maximum output to the lead creditor, the producer is allowed to complete the production to
obtain 1 ￿ ￿ fraction of maximum output. The resource allocation is e¢ cient ex post. But the ex ante
resource allocation may not be e¢ cient because of the credit constraint which arises from the possibility
7b
￿
t+1 ￿ ￿￿yt+1: (4)
Also, the domestic lead creditor restricts her loan (bt+1) so that the total sum of loans
does not exceed ￿ fraction of output:
bt+1 + b
￿
t+1 ￿ ￿yt+1: (5)
We take both ￿ and ￿ as exogenous parameters to represent the degrees of devel-
opment of the country￿ s ￿nancial institution. We consider the size of ￿ as a domestic
collateral factor, representing the overall ￿nancial depth of the home economy. The gap
between ￿￿ and ￿ re￿ ects the di⁄erence between the outside creditors and the lead cred-
itor in their skills of production and bargaining (being in￿ uenced by legal protection of
the outside creditors6).
The ￿ ow-of-funds constraint of the entrepreneur is given by









where wt is the real wage rate, rt is the domestic real gross interest rate, r￿ is the foreign
real gross interest rate, and bt and b￿
t are domestic and foreign borrowing. Consumption
ct and investment on the wage bill wtlt in the left-hand side (LHS) of this equation are
￿nanced by the net worth yt ￿ bt ￿ b￿
t and the domestic and foreign new borrowing in
the right hand side (RHS). The entrepreneur chooses consumption, labor input, output





to maximize utility subject to
of the default and negotiation. We assume there is no reputation to enforce debts, because there is no
record keeping of the past defaults.
6See La Porta, Shleifer, Lopez-de-Silanes and Vishny (1997,1998).
8the constraints of production technology, the ￿ ow-of-funds, and the international and
domestic borrowing constraints.
We now turn to workers. Unlike the entrepreneurs, the workers do not have produc-
tion technology, nor any collateralizable asset in order to borrow either domestically or
internationally. They choose consumption ct, labor supply lt, and domestic and foreign
net borrowings (bt+1 and b￿









subject to the ￿ ow of funds constraint









and the borrowing constraints, bt+1 ￿ 0 and b￿
t+1 ￿ 0. We make the standard assump-
tions u0(c ￿ v) > 0;u"(c ￿ v) < 0; and v(0) = 0;v0(l) > 0;v"(l) > 0: We normalize the
population size of workers to be unity.
We ￿nally assume that there is no constraint on domestic agent￿ s lending to the
foreigners and that the foreign interest rate r￿ is exogenous being strictly less than the
time preference rate7
r
￿ < 1=￿: (7)
2.2 Equilibrium
We now derive the general properties of the competitive equilibrium. If the domestic
interest rate were strictly lower than the foreign interest rate, the domestic savers would
7The underlying assumption is that the rest of the world is also subject to credit frictions described
above. As is shown later, the equilibrium interest rate under this environment is lower than ￿
￿1.
9lend to foreigners instead of lending to domestic borrowers while there would be many




The entrepreneur has a few choices of accumulating net worth. Let Rt(at) be the
maximum rate of return on the net worth from date t to date t+1 for the entrepreneur











wt ￿ (at￿￿=r￿) ￿ [at(1 ￿ ￿)￿=rt]
￿
: (9)
The ￿rst term in the brackets of RHS is the rate of return on domestic loan. The second
term is the rate of return on production without borrowing. The third term is the rate of
return on production with maximum foreign borrowing. By borrowing from foreigners
secured by ￿￿ fraction of output, the entrepreneur can ￿nance externally at￿￿=r￿ amount
of unit labor cost. Thus the denominator is the required net worth (downpayment) for
the unit labor input, and the numerator is the output after repaying the debt. The last
term is the rate of return on production with maximum borrowing from both foreigners
and the domestic lead creditor. The denominator is downpayment for hiring unit labor,
when the entrepreneur ￿nances at￿￿=r￿ of unit labor cost by borrowing from foreigners,
and ￿nances at(1 ￿ ￿)￿=rt by borrowing additionally from the domestic lead creditor
at interest rate rt: Note that the entrepreneur prefers to borrow maximum ￿rst from
foreigners at a lower interest rate.
In the expression of maximum rate of return on net worth (9); each of the last
three rates are strictly higher for the productive entrepreneur than the unproductive
entrepreneur, while the rate of return on domestic loan is the same for both. Thus,
10in equilibrium the unproductive entrepreneurs lend to productive entrepreneurs, and
produce if and only if their rate of return on production is equal to the domestic interest
rate - otherwise, they specialize in providing loan.8 Therefore the domestic interest rate
and employment of unproductive entrepreneur satisfy9
Rt(￿) = rt ￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿￿)
wt ￿ (￿￿￿=r￿)











wt ￿ (￿￿￿=r￿) ￿ [￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿=rt]
￿ rt:
Given the optimal choice of accumulating net worth, the ￿ ow-of-funds constraint (6)
can be written as
zt+1 = Rt(at)(zt ￿ ct);
where zt ￿ yt ￿ bt ￿ b￿
t denotes the net worth of the entrepreneur at date t. When
the entrepreneur chooses consumption to maximize his logarithmic utility subject to







. Then we have the explicit consumption function as
ct = (1 ￿ ￿)zt = (1 ￿ ￿)(yt ￿ bt ￿ b
￿
t): (11)
The productive agents produce with their domestic and international borrowing con-
straints binding if the rate of return on production with maximum leverage exceeds the
8Later, we will show that the workers will not lend nor borrow in the equilibrium.
9We note here that as long as rt ￿ r￿, the rate of return on production with maximum borrowing
from abroad is at least as great as the rate of return on production without borrowing.
11domestic interest rate. Thus, from (4)(5)(6); and (11), their employment is given by
lt ￿
￿zt
wt ￿ (￿￿￿=r￿) ￿ [￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿=rt]
; (12)
and equality holds if Rt(￿) > rt.
Regarding the workers, their labor supply ls








Thus dLs=dwt > 0: They will decumulate their asset until the borrowing constraint
becomes binding, if the domestic real interest rate is strictly less than the time preference
rate:
rt < 1=￿: (13)
We will later verify this inequality holds in the neighborhood of the steady state equi-




t = 0; and ct = wtL
s(wt): (14)
Now let us de￿ne aggregate variables. Denote aggregate quantities of the productive
entrepreneurs, the unproductive entrepreneurs, and workers of a generic quantity yt
by Yt; Y 0
t; and Y w
t . De￿ne B￿
t as the aggregate net debt of all the home entrepreneurs
against foreigners matured at date t. Then, aggregate net worth of all the entrepreneurs,
10The workers do not save, not because the workers are impatient relative to the entrepreneurs, but
because the real interest rate is lower than the time preference rate in equilibrium. The entrepreneurs
nonetheless save because their rate of return on net worth exceeds the time preference rate when they
are productive. If the workers expect sharp decline of wage in future, then they may save despite of the
interest rate being lower than the time preference rate. Throughout the paper we do not consider such
expectations.
12denoted by Zt, is given by
Zt = Yt + Y
0





Furthermore, let st be the share of net worth of all the productive entrepreneurs, so that
stZt is the aggregate net worth of the productive entrepreneurs. Then, because of the




wt ￿ (￿￿￿=r￿) ￿ [￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿=rt]
; (16)


































t+1 = 0: (20)
The term in the bracket of the RHS of equation (19) are the net supply of goods by
the foreigners to domestic agents. In equation (20), the domestic borrowing and lending
should be net out in aggregate, even though the total debts of the domestic agents need
not because of the international borrowing and lending.
The competitive equilibrium is de￿ned as a set of prices (rt;wt) and quantities (yt, lt,
ct, bt+1, b￿




t , Bt+1, B0
t+1, B￿
t+1), which is consistent with the
13choice of all the individual entrepreneurs and workers as well as the clearing conditions
of markets for labor, goods and domestic credit. Because there is no shocks except for
the idiosyncratic shock to the productivity of each entrepreneur, the agents have perfect
foresight of future prices and aggregate quantities in the equilibrium.
By aggregating the consumption of the entrepreneurs (11) and using (15), market
clearing condition (19) can be written as
wtL




The LHS is gross investment on wage bill by the entrepreneurs, and the RHS is the
sum of gross saving and foreign borrowing of the entrepreneurs. The foreign borrowing
satis￿es the international borrowing constraints:
B
￿
t+1 ￿ ￿￿(Yt+1 + Y
0
t+1) = ￿￿(￿Lt + ￿L
0
t); (22)
where the equality holds if rt > r￿.
We take the aggregate net worth of the entrepreneurs (Zt) and the share of the
productive entrepreneurs￿net worth (st) as the state variables of the economy at date
t. The law of motion of aggregate wealth is given by
Zt+1 = (1 + xt)rt￿stZt + rt￿(1 ￿ st)Zt (23)






￿ ￿ wtrt + ￿￿￿rt￿r￿
r￿
wtrt ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿rt￿r￿
r￿
: (24)
14is the extra rate of return of the productive entrepreneur over the unproductive entre-
preneur. Here, the accumulation of wealth depends upon not only the interest rate and
saving rate but also the distribution of wealth, because the saving of the productive
entrepreneurs earns the extra rate of returns. We can also derive the law of motion of
the share of productive entrepreneurs￿net worth as
st+1 =




(1 ￿ ￿)st(1 + xt) + n￿(1 ￿ st)
1 + stxt
:
The denominator of RHS of the ￿rst equation is the aggregate net worth in the next
period. The numerator is the aggregate net worth of productive agents in the next
period, which is the sum of the net worth of those who continue to be productive,
(1￿￿)(1+xt)rt￿stZt; and those who shift from unproductive to be productive, n￿rt￿(1￿







that satis￿es (16 - 18), and (21 - 25) as functions of
the state variables (st;Zt):
Finally, in the subsequent analysis it would be of interest to see the total factor
productivity (TFP) of the economy. Since labor is the only input, the TFP is de￿ned











The property that the TFP is an increasing function of the fraction of labor employed
by productive entrepreneurs is a unique feature of our credit constrained economy.
153 Steady State under Financial Autarky
Before looking into how the economy adjusts to capital account liberalization, it is useful
to analyze the steady state of the economy before liberalization - the economy which has
no ￿nancial transaction with foreigners (￿ = 0). Since goods are homogeneous and labor
is not mobile across the border, the economy becomes autarky. In the steady state, all
the endogenous variables are constant. Let us de￿ne X = sx; the product of the share
of net worth and the extra rate of return of productive agents ￿the importance of extra


























1 = ￿(1 + X)r; (32)
F(X;x) = X
2 + [￿(1 + n) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)x]X ￿ n￿x = 0; and X ￿ 0: (33)
In the steady state equilibrium of the autarky economy, these seven equilibrium condi-
tions determine (r;w;x;X;L;L0;Z) endogenously. Then, we have the following propo-
sition in which upper script a represents variables under autarky. (Proofs of all the
Propositions are in Appendix).
Proposition 1 The steady state equilibrium of the autarky economy depends upon the
16￿nancial depth of the economy ￿ as:
1. If ￿ < ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿
￿ +(1+n)￿; the unproductive entrepreneurs produce in equilibrium,
and the productive entrepreneurs are credit constrained with Aa(￿);wa(￿) being an
increasing function of ￿ while ra(￿) being decreasing in ￿.
2. If ￿ 2 [￿; 1
1+n); the unproductive entrepreneurs do not produce, while the productive
entrepreneurs are credit constrained with Aa(￿) = ￿, wa(￿) = ￿￿ and ra(￿) being
an increasing function of ￿.
3. If ￿ > 1
1+n; no entrepreneurs are credit constrained with Aa(￿) = ￿;wa(￿) = ￿￿
and ra(￿) = ￿
￿1:
Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 1. In the ￿rst region where ￿ is below the threshold
￿, the allocation of labor is ine¢ cient because the unproductive entrepreneurs employ
workers. Intuitively, if the domestic ￿nancial system is underdeveloped, then it fails
to transfer enough purchasing power from the unproductive entrepreneurs (savers) to
the productive entrepreneurs (investors), so that the unproductive entrepreneurs end up
employing workers. Since production allocation is ine¢ cient, the aggregate wealth and
the wage rate remain low.11 Furthermore, both TFP and the wage rate are increasing
functions of ￿. Intuitively, the better the domestic ￿nancial system is with a higher ￿,
the larger is the share of workers employed by the productive entrepreneurs, the higher
are TFP and wage rate.12 The interest rate is an decreasing function of ￿ below the
11Note that ￿ is an increasing function of the exit rate ￿ and an decreasing function of the productivity
gap between productive and unproductive entrepreneurs (￿ ￿ ￿)=￿. Thus for a given ￿nancial depth
￿, the economy is more likely to be ine¢ cient in production if the exit rate is high or the productivity
gap is small so that the share of net worth of the productive entrepreneurs is limited.
12Kiyotaki (1998) and Caselli and Gennaioli (2003) made similar observation on why TFP depends
upon the ￿nancial depth of the economy.
17threshold ￿, because the interest rate is equal to the rate of returns on production for
the unproductive entrepreneurs (which is a decreasing function of wage rate and ￿).
In the second region, ￿ 2 [￿; 1
1+n), all the savings are transferred to the productive
entrepreneurs so that aggregate output is at the maximum for a given total employment.
It does not mean the allocation is the ￿rst best, because individual consumption is not
smooth as the credit constraint is binding for productive entrepreneurs. Since the TFP
is given by ￿, the wage is given by ￿￿. In this region, the interest rate is increasing
in ￿ because a higher ￿ simply means a larger demand for domestic credit relative to
supply.13
In the third region ￿ ￿ 1
1+n where the domestic ￿nancial system is so well developed
that none is credit constrained. Both the productive and unproductive entrepreneurs
enjoy the same rate of return on saving, behaving similarly, and thus the entrepreneurs
as a whole behave like the representative entrepreneur. The economy achieves the ￿rst
best allocation.
The autarky interest rate is lower than the time preference rate for ￿ < 1=(1 + n).
This veri￿es our conjecture (13).14 Another property of the autarky steady state is that
the interest rate is not monotone with respect to ￿. It is decreasing in ￿ when ￿ < ￿ ￿ and
is increasing when between ￿ ￿ and 1=(1+n). As is analyzed below, this non-monotonicity
has important implications for the e⁄ects of the capital account liberalization.
13In Figure 1, autarky net real interest rate could be negative in the neighborhood of ￿ ￿: For those
values of ￿; there exists another equilibrium in which intrinsecally useless ￿at money circulates with
value and the net real interest rate becomes zero. As long as the net foreign interest rate is positive the
existence of this equilibrium will not change the qualitative features of our analysis of capital account
liberalization.
14Because (13) no longer holds for ￿ ￿ 1=(1 + n), workers may not be credit constrained. Also, since
x = 0 (X = 0) we must use (16) instead of (28) in order to characterize the equilibrium. If we rede￿ne
Z as the total wealth of the economy, instead of the aggregate net worth of the entrepreneurs, then the
remaining equilibrium conditions are unchanged.
184 Adjusting to Capital Account Liberalization
We now study how the economy is going to adjust to the liberalization of ￿nancial
transactions with foreigners, starting from the steady state autarky equilibrium towards
a new steady state. Because the interest rate under autarky steady state ra (￿) is a
decreasing function of ￿ for ￿ < ￿, and is an increasing function of ￿ for ￿ 2 [￿; 1
1+n) by


















; at which the
foreign interest rate schedule intersects the domestic autarky interest rate (see Figure
2). The second inequality in (34) implies that the foreign interest rate is higher than
the minimum value of the domestic interest rate in the steady state under autarky.15
Figure 2 shows that ra(￿) > r￿ for ￿ 2 [0;￿1), ra(￿) < r￿ for ￿ 2 (￿1;￿2), and
ra(￿) > r￿ for ￿ > ￿2. Note that ine¢ ciency of the production due to credit frictions
a⁄ects the domestic interest rate ra(￿) through the two channels: while smaller borrowing
capacity of the productive entrepreneurs lowers ra(￿), lower wage pushes up ra(￿). In
￿ 2 [0;￿1), the wage e⁄ect dominates and therefore ra(￿) is higher than r￿, which will
lead to capital in￿ ow following the liberalization. We call this region ￿ wage suppression￿ .
In ￿ 2 (￿1;￿2), the e⁄ect of smaller borrowing capacity dominates that of lower wage.
We call this region ￿ interest rate suppression￿ 16. Since ra(￿) is lower than r￿, the country
will experience capital out￿ ow after liberalization. Finally, when ￿ > ￿2, home economy
15If the foreign economy has the same environment as the home economy except for ￿, then this
assumption holds except for the exceptional case that foreign ￿ is exactly equal to ￿.
16Shaw (1973) and McKinnon (1973) consider ￿nancial suppression as an outcome of government
low interest rate policy to the savers. Because our ￿nancial suppression comes from the limitation of
commitment and borrowing capacity, we call it as "interest rate suppression" hereafter.
19has more advanced ￿nancial system than the rest of the world so that ra(￿) is higher
than r￿, causing capital in￿ ow. We refer to this region as the ￿ advanced ￿nancial system￿ .
Thus the direction of capital ￿ ow crucially depends on the degree of domestic ￿nancial
development relative to the rest of the world.
While some analytical results are available, it is easier to illustrate transition dynam-
ics based on numerical examples. Given that our model is highly stylized, we do not
intend to calibrate the model to match a particular country. The purpose is the quali-
tative analysis of how a country￿ s adjustment to liberalization depends on its degree of
￿nancial development relative to that of the rest of the world. The parameter values
used in the numerical examples are explained in Appendix E.
4.1 Wage Suppression
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the dynamics of the economy under wage suppression for a low
level of domestic ￿nancial development ￿ = 0:15 < ￿1. Under wage suppression, the wage
rate is so low that even the unproductive entrepreneurs enjoy a higher rate of return on
production under autarky than the foreign interest rate. Thus both unproductive and
productive entrepreneurs borrow from abroad. However, since the borrowing capacity
is small, capital in￿ ow is limited. The productive entrepreneurs also borrow from the
unproductive entrepreneurs who become their lead creditors in the domestic credit mar-
ket. Here, the unproductive entrepreneurs serve as ￿nancial intermediary: they borrow
from the foreigners secured by the fraction of their output at the world interest rate
r￿, and, at the same time, extend loan to the productive entrepreneurs in the domestic
credit market as the lead creditors at the domestic interest rate rt. The fact that the
unproductive entrepreneurs act as ￿nancial intermediary stems from the fact that in-
20ternational borrowing constraint is tighter than the domestic borrowing constraint (i.e.,
0 < ￿ < 1).17
The dynamics of the wage suppression economy is characterized by a temporary
boom followed by stagnation. Immediately after the liberalization, the unproductive
entrepreneurs expands production by borrowing from abroad at a cheaper interest rate.
The total employment increases with capital in￿ ow, which pushes up the wages. The
expansion, however, is short-lived. Because the employment by the productive entrepre-
neurs is crowded out with a higher wage, TFP keeps decreasing from autarky level. After
the international borrowing constraint becomes binding, output and wage rate start de-
creasing until the economy converges to its new steady state. The long-run e⁄ect on
output is marginal.
4.2 Interest Rate Suppression
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the dynamics of the economy under the interest rate suppression
for a medium level of domestic ￿nancial development ￿ = 0:3 2 [￿1;￿2]. The adjustment
process under the interest rate suppression is characterized by temporary drop in wages
and employment followed by gradual expansion. Because the unproductive entrepre-
neurs start lending abroad and reduce employment, wage and total employment drop
immediately after liberalization. While total employment and employment of unpro-
ductive entrepreneurs fall, employment of productive entrepreneurs rise due to cheap
wage rate and borrowing rate. As a result, TFP improves. Over time, employment of
productive entrepreneurs increases together with their accumulation of net worth, until
17During the rapid economic growth era after the World War II, Japanese general trading companies
played a role of ￿nancial intermediary, borrowing from abroad against their international collateral and
lending to domestic businesses. Possibly, countries like India and China (at least in the early stage)
may experience this type of adjustment. Caballero and Krishnamurty (2001) has a similar feature.
21it absorbs the entire employment. Thereafter, the wage rate and employment start re-
covering. Intuitively the international capital market has a catalyst e⁄ect by eliminating
the ine¢ ciency in production in the long run through accumulation of net worth.18
4.3 Advanced Domestic Financial System
When domestic ￿nancial system is more advanced than the rest of the world, autarky
interest rate is higher than the world interest rate due to large borrowing capacity of the
productive entrepreneurs. After liberalization, the productive domestic entrepreneurs
will attract foreign fund, causing capital in￿ ow. The unproductive entrepreneurs con-
tinue to specialize in lending. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the dynamics of the economy
under advanced domestic ￿nancial system ￿ = 0:8 > ￿2. The total employment (which
is equal to employment of the productive entrepreneurs) expands at the beginning and
then stays roughly constant.19
Similar to the analysis by Caballero et al. (2006) and Mendoza et al. (2007) our
framework suggests the existence of ￿equilibrium imbalances￿in which countries with
more developed ￿nancial system experience capital in￿ ows as they integrate with less
￿nancially developed economies. Intuitively, the home economy can take advantage
of the relatively low interest rate (and the saving glut) of the rest of the world. A
distinguishing feature of our work is that capital in￿ ow needs not be the result of superior
domestic ￿nancial system, because it can be a result of wage suppression. But the key
di⁄erence among these two types of capital in￿ ow is that TFP stays high with capital
in￿ ow induced by a superior ￿nancial system, while the TFP deteriorates and the boom is
18Perhaps, some Latin American countries experience this type of adjustment, which is characterized
by capital out￿ ow and the loss of employment of the unproductive sector, which may cultivate the
anti-globalization sentiment.
19This depends on the elasticity of labour with respect to wage. If labour supply is elastic enough,
then the employment continues to increase.
22temporary when capital in￿ ow is caused by the wage suppression with an underdeveloped
domestic ￿nancial system.
4.4 Steady State after Liberalization
The new steady state after capital account liberalization depends upon the relative level
of domestic ￿nancial development to the rest of the world as:
Proposition 2 Let r(￿) and w(￿) be the domestic interest rate and the wage rate in the
steady state equilibrium after liberalization with ￿nancial depth ￿.
1. Wage suppression, ￿ < ￿1: Unproductive entrepreneurs produce and the home
interest rate stays above the foreign interest rate: r￿ < r(￿) < ra(￿), w(￿) > wa(￿),
r0(￿) < 0 and w0(￿) > 0:
2. Interest rate suppression, ￿ 2 [￿1;￿2]: Unproductive entrepreneurs do not produce,
and the home and foreign interest rates are equalized: ra(￿) ￿ r(￿) = r￿, A(￿) =
￿ ￿ Aa(￿), and w0(￿) > 0:
3. Advanced domestic ￿nancial system, ￿ > ￿2: Unproductive entrepreneurs do not
produce. The home and foreign interest rates are equalized if ￿2 < ￿ ￿ e ￿ ￿
￿+￿￿[n￿+(1=￿r￿)￿1]
(1+n)￿+(1=￿r￿)￿1 2 (￿2;1): The home interest rate stays above the foreign interest
rate if ￿ > e ￿. In both cases, ra(￿) > r(￿), w(￿) > wa(￿); A(￿) = ￿ = Aa(￿),
r0(￿) ￿ 0 and w0(￿) > 0:
Note that unproductive entrepreneurs do not produce if the ￿nancial depth is at least
as high as ￿1: Thus the economy is more likely to achieve e¢ ciency in production for the
same ￿nancial depth in the new steady state than autarky. Also, we observe that capital
23account liberalization does not necessarily leads to the complete ￿nancial integration of
the home economy with the rest of the world. If the ￿nancial depth of the economy is
very di⁄erent from the rest of the world, either extremely low ￿ < ￿1 or extremely high
￿ > ~ ￿; the domestic interest rate stays higher than the foreign interest rate because the
international borrowing constraint is binding. From Proposition 2, we learn wage rate
and total employment are increasing functions of the ￿nancial depth of the economy ￿
for the entire range of ￿.
5 Welfare and Government Policies
5.1 Welfare Analysis
From the analysis of the previous section, we learn that the capital account liberalization
is not necessarily bene￿cial, especially when the domestic ￿nancial system is underdevel-
oped. If the wage suppression is pronounced under ￿nancial autarky, the liberalization
does not improve the TFP and thus the boom is temporary. If the interest rate sup-
pression is signi￿cant, the liberalization causes capital out￿ ow and decline in wages and
employment during the transition, even though the TFP will improve in the long-run.
A natural question is to what extent capital account liberalization is bene￿cial for the
country, and how the costs and bene￿ts are distributed among di⁄erent groups. To
answer this question, we examine the welfare e⁄ects on workers and productive and un-
productive entrepreneurs separately. (We do not use Pareto e¢ ciency criteria of whether
everyone can be better o⁄ with suitable redistribution, because it is di¢ cult to enforce
redistribution with limited collateral).
We measure the welfare e⁄ect of capital account liberalization by a constant per-
24productive unproductive workers
wage suppression -0.025 -0.025 0.0022
interest rate suppression 0.25 0.25 -0.018
advanced ￿nance -0.086 -0.19 0.014
Table 1: Welfare analysis
centage change of steady state autarky consumption that is required to make an agent
indi⁄erent between liberalizing capital account and staying in autarky. In computing
this measure, we take into account the e⁄ects of the transition dynamics from autarky
to the post-liberalization steady state. Formally, for each entrepreneurs i, we de￿ne this





















t is date t consumption of entrepreneur i after the liberalization at date 0, starting
from the autarky steady state at date ￿1, and cia is his consumption under autarky
steady state.
The welfare measure of workers is de￿ned in a similar way. Assume that the utility
of the workers is logarithmic: u(c ￿ v(l)) = log(c ￿ v(l)) and that the disutility of labor
is constantly elastic: v(l) = 1











where ￿w is consumption equivalent for the workers. Here ca and la respectively denote
consumption and labor supply under autarky.
Table 1 reports the welfare e⁄ect of capital account liberalization for the cases corre-
sponding to wage suppression, interest rate suppression and advanced domestic ￿nancial
25system, using the numerical example of the previous section. The headline of ￿ produc-
tive￿implies the group of entrepreneurs who are productive and ￿ unproductive￿is the
group who is unproductive at the time of liberalization. Under wage suppression, capital
in￿ ow is limited and boom is temporary because the borrowing constraint is tight and
as a result the welfare e⁄ects of liberalization are small compared to the other two cases.
The workers gain only modestly from the temporary boom and the entrepreneurs lose
modestly from the lower expected rates of return.
Under interest-rate suppression, the economy experiences an initial recession before
improving the TFP in the long-run. The workers tend to lose since the loss from the
lower wages during the initial recession is large compared to the possible long-run gains
in a distant future. The entrepreneurs gain substantially because their rate of return
become higher. The unproductive (savers) obtain better saving opportunities abroad
at the higher world interest rate, and the productive entrepreneurs achieve higher rate
of return due to lower wages. The welfare e⁄ects on the entrepreneurs are much larger
than those on workers since changes in the rate of return have compound e⁄ects on their
consumption through wealth accumulation.
Finally, in the case of advanced ￿nancial system, the workers gain due to perma-
nently higher wages. The entrepreneurs lose because they face lower rate of return. In
particular, unproductive entrepreneurs loose substantially because they are savers at the
time of liberalization and their rate of return on saving drops to the world interest rate.
In contrast, productive entrepreneurs do not loose as much because they can expand
production by borrowing at a cheaper world interest rate even though the wage rate is
higher.
From these analysis, we learn that there tends to be con￿ icts of interests between
workers and entrepreneurs towards the capital account liberalization. The welfare of the
26workers tend to be more in￿ uenced by the short-run movement of the aggregate economy
immediately after the liberalization, because the workers do not smooth consumption
due to the binding borrowing constraint. In contrast, the entrepreneurs tend to care more
about the subsequent rates of return which depends upon the long-run performance of
the economy.
From a policy maker￿ s point of view, the case of interest-rate suppression would be of
particular interest. This is because capital account liberalization of private capital ￿ ows
can eventually eliminate the ine¢ ciency of production, but such process can be painful to
the workers who su⁄er from lower wage and employment. Can the government mitigate
the loss of workers during the adjustment to the capital liberalization? One possibility
is redistribution, but the government may face a limited enforcement problem similar
to that of the private agents as long as the domestic ￿nancial and legal systems are not
developed enough. Therefore, in the next two Sections we consider two di⁄erent types
of policy intervention. The ￿rst one is a simple tax and subsidy policy under balanced
budget constraint, while the second one is to allow foreign direct investment (FDI) ￿ ows
along with private capital ￿ ows in the process of capital account liberalization.
5.2 Tax and Subsidy under Interest Rate Suppression
The reason for which wages drop temporarily under interest-rate suppression is that
the unproductive entrepreneurs lend abroad and shrink their production. In order to
mitigate the drop in wages, we consider a production subsidy to unproductive agents by
imposing taxes on the productive agents. We assume balanced budget, so the budget
constraint of the government sector is given by
￿t￿1Y
0
t = ￿t￿1Yt; (37)
27where ￿t represents subsidy rate and ￿t represents tax rate.20
Limited commitment and shortage of collateral have implications for both private
￿nance and public ￿nance. Because the tax liability to the government is considered to




t+1 ￿ ￿￿yt+1; (38)
￿tyt+1 + b
￿
t+1 + bt+1 ￿ ￿yt+1: (39)
The ￿rst constraint implies that the foreign creditors will limit their loans so that the
sum of the tax liability and the foreign debt repayment does not exceed the value of
collateral for the outside creditors. The second constraint says the domestic lead creditor
restricts her loan so that the sum of all liabilities of the entrepreneur does not exceed
the collateral value of the project to the lead creditor. In what follows, we assume that
the tax liability of the entrepreneur does not exceed the collateral value for the outside
creditors: ￿tyt+1 ￿ ￿￿yt+1.21 The ￿ ow-of-fund constraint of the productive entrepreneur
becomes









The unproductive entrepreneur￿ s ￿ ow-of-fund constraint is similar to (40), term ￿￿t￿1
being replaced by ￿t￿1.22 In Appendix D we describe the set of equilibrium conditions.
20The role of public debt as liquidity in an economy under credit constraint is an interesting question.
For example, Woodford (1990) considers a model with heterogeneous entrepreneurs who cannot borrow,
in order to argue that government can issue public debt to absorb the saving of the unproductive
entrepreneurs and improve the e¢ ciency. See, also, Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). However, a systematic
analysis of public debt under credit-constrained economy is beyond the scope of this paper and is left
for future research.
21This constraint can be an outcome of limited power of government who cannot enforce tax liability
more than the outside creditors.
22We assume that the unproductive entrepreneur who receive production subsidy cannot borrow
against the future production subsidy, because the creditor who take over the project may not receive
28productive unproductive workers
without government 0.25 0.25 -0.018
with government 0.17 0.24 -0.013
Table 2: Welfare with government under interest-rate suppression
Figure 6 shows the dynamics of the economy with government under interest-rate
suppression. Here, subsidy is chosen to set the wage immediately after liberalization as
wt =  w
a + (1 ￿  )w
l
t;
where wa is wage under autarky steady state and wl
t ￿ ￿=r￿ is wage immediately after
liberalization without government policy. Here   is set 0.3. There is a trade-o⁄ for
our government policy. On one hand, the unproductive entrepreneurs who receive sub-
sidy employ more workers than the laissez faire economy during transition. As a result
employment is larger with the government policy. On the other hand, taxation on the
productive entrepreneurs decrease their capacity of private borrowing. As a result their
accumulation of net worth and expansion of employment are slower. Thus the transition
to the equilibrium with e¢ cient production takes longer than the laissez faire econ-
omy.23 Eventually, the unproductive entrepreneurs stop producing, and thereafter the
adjustment is identical to the laissez faire economy. Table 2 shows welfare consequences
of the government policy. Not surprisingly, workers￿loss is mitigated. The productive
entrepreneur￿ s gain from liberalization shrinks by the taxation. The unproductive en-
trepreneur￿ s gain does not change much, because their rate of return is still given by the
foreign interest rate despite of receiving the production subsidy.
the production subsidy from the government.
23If subsidy is large enough to maintain the autarky wage, the employment of the productive entrepre-
neurs starts shrinking as their net worth deccumulates. Then the tax rate on output of the productive
agents have to be higher in order to balance the budget, which leads to further deccumulation of their
net worth. Thus, the large subsidy program is not sustainable in the long run.
295.3 Foreign Direct Investment
Another policy intervention which has become increasingly more important is to allow
foreign direct investment (FDI) along with ￿nancial capital ￿ ows.24 Allowing FDI might
imply smaller distortion than the tax and subsidy policy of the previous section. Also,
it has been argued that FDI tends to be the least volatile type of capital ￿ ows because
it involves relatively irreversible types of investment (physical capital, human capital,
managerial resources)25. Therefore allowing FDI may make countries less vulnerable to
capital out￿ ow. In this section we are interested in examining whether the FDI is able
to mitigate the losses of workers in the interest rate suppression region.26






where yt+1 is output of goods at date t + 1, l￿
t is the labor input at date t, and ￿￿ is
constant productivity of foreign ￿rms. Here we assume that foreign productivity is at
least as big as the productivity level of the productive entrepreneurs, ￿￿ ￿ ￿. Since we
consider a small open economy, when foreigners make their decisions about FDI they
24As documented recently in Prasad and Rajan (2008), the share of foreign direct investment ￿ ows
has now become far more important than that of debt in gross private capital ￿ ows to nonindustrial
countries. The share of foreign direct investment in total gross in￿ ows to emerging markets and other
developing countries has risen from about 25 percent in 1990-94 to nearly 50 percent by 2000-04. Over
the same period, the share of debt in in￿ ows to emerging markets has fallen from 64 percent to 39
percent.
25Kose et al. (2006) looks at the volatility of di⁄erent types of in￿ ows, calculated as the cross-country
averages of the standard deviations of di⁄erent types of in￿ ows (measured as ratios to GDP) over the
period 1985-2004. They ￿nd that gross in￿ ows of debt ￿nancing are substantially more volatile than
FDI or equity in￿ ows.
26A important issue in FDI is technology transfer (see for example Blalock and Gertler (2008) for the
case of Indonesian manufacturing establishment). While it is certainly an important issue we abstract
from it because our main focus in the paper is to explore how liberalization of international ￿nancial
transactions a⁄ect resource allocation among heterogeneous producers subject to credit constraints. We
believe we can analyze the role of FDI in this regard without considering the spillover e⁄ects.
30are not subject to borrowing constraints. Therefore the relevant discount factor is the
international interest rate r￿:
On the other hand, it seems natural to assume that foreign producers face frictions
in expanding production: In particular, it takes time and cost for the foreign employers
to recruit suitable workers who understand technology and organization of the ￿rm. We
capture this by search frictions along the line of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). In
order to hire a suitable worker, a foreign employer maintains an open vacancy at ￿ ow
cost c. A ￿ ow of new worker-employer matches is given by a constant-returns-to-scale
function M(Ht;Vt), where Ht is the number of searching workers and Vt is the number
of vacancies in the economy. Here we assume that all the workers (including the workers
employed by the domestic ￿rms) can costlessy look for jobs in foreign ￿rms. Then
given the constant population of workers, Ht is constant. For simplicity, we assume
that workers can supply labor to domestic and foreign ￿rms simultaneously, and that
each worker supplies one unit of labor when they match with foreign producers, so
that foreign ￿rms have only extensive margin to adjust labor. Finally, the relationship
between foreign ￿rm and a worker might end every period with a exogenous separation
rate 1 ￿ ￿.









t￿1 + M(H;Vt); (42)
where the ￿rst term represents the fraction of employed workers who remain employed
in foreign ￿rms and the second component represents workers who ￿nd a job. The
31matching function is given by






The model is completed by the relationship that determines the link between the
value of the vacancy and the value of the job. The recursive equation for the value of
the vacancy is given by
J
v










t is the value of the vacancy, ￿V
￿￿
t represents the rate at which the vacancy is
￿lled and Jt is the value of the job that evolves accordingly to
Jt =
￿￿
r￿ ￿ wt +
￿
r￿Jt+1: (45)
In (45), the term ￿￿
r￿ ￿ wt represents the current net bene￿t from the match while the
last term represents the continuation value which depends on the separation rate. We
assume free entry, implying that Jv
t = 0 at all times. In contrast to the production
by the foreign ￿rms, we continue to assume that all the workers are homogeneous and
suitable for the production by the domestic entrepreneurs. Assuming that the foreign
￿rms have full bargaining power against the workers, the foreigners will choose the wage
equal to the competitive wage level.







32Once we use (42), (43) and (44) to substitute out the measure of vacancies, Vt;








that satis￿es (16), (17), (21 - 25), (42), (45),
and (46) as functions of the state variables (st;Zt;L￿
t￿1):
In the subsequent analysis we focus on the adjustment in the case of interest-rate
suppression when the economy starts from its steady state without international ￿nancial
transactions but with FDI allowed. Then the economy liberalizes the international
￿nancial transaction with the continued presence of FDI. This exercise seems to be
useful for thinking about the experience of some countries, such as China, which is
allowing FDI while keeping strict restrictions on international ￿nancial capital ￿ ows.
Figure 7 shows how the presence of the FDI changes the adjustment of the ￿nancially
suppressed economy to the liberalization of international ￿nancial transactions. The
parameter values used are discussed in Appendix. Solid line and uneven dotted line plot
the dynamic path with FDI. For comparison, even dotted lines plot the adjustment of the
economy without FDI ￿ identical to Figure 4.2. Prior to liberalization of international
￿nancial transaction with the presence of the FDI, employment of the unproductive
domestic entrepreneurs is smaller and the TFP is higher than the steady state without
the FDI, because a fraction of workers are employed by productive foreign ￿rms.27
Immediately after the liberalization of international ￿nancial transaction, wages fall
as much as the case without the presence of FDI. This is because, as long as the un-
productive entrepreneurs still produce, the unproductive agents are indi⁄erent between
producing and lending abroad: ￿=wt = r￿. However, because employment of foreign
27Because of our speci￿c feature of the domestic entrepreneurial sector (such as constant returns to
scale production function, constant turnover rate, and constant saving rate), the FDI does not change
the share of wealth and employment of the productive entrepreneurs within the domestic entrepreneurial
sector. Thus the wage rate, total employment and domestic interest rate are not a⁄ected by the FDI
in the steady state under ￿nancial autarky.
33productive unproductive workers
without FDI 0.2533 0.2533 -0.01815
with FDI 0.2532 0.2532 -0.01807
Table 3: Welfare with FDI under interest-rate suppression
￿rms expands in addition to that of productive entrepreneurs, it takes less time for the
unproductive production to be eliminated and the wage level recovers more quickly.28
Table 3 reports the welfare e⁄ect of capital account liberalization with and without
FDI. Qualitatively, we see that by shortening the initial recession FDI mitigates the
workers￿ s loss. However under our chosen parameter values the e⁄ect is very small.29
The presence of FDI does not have much e⁄ect on the welfare of entrepreneurs either
since their rate of return is not directly a⁄ected by the presence of FDI. Overall, by
making domestic entrepreneurial employment smaller, the presence of FDI speeds up
the necessary adjustment to the liberalization of the international ￿nancial transactions.
However, the prices and the distributions among the domestic sectors in the new steady
state are mostly determined by the domestic institution, not directly a⁄ected by the
FDI in our framework in which there is no direct spillover e⁄ects from the FDI to the
domestic technology and institution.
28At the new steady state again, the presence of the FDI does not a⁄ect the distribution of wealth
and employment between productive and unproductive domestic entrepreneurs, and thus does not a⁄ect
wage rate and total employment.
29The share of FDI in the initial period (i.e., at the time of liberalization) is important in determining
the quantitative signi￿cance of the welfare e⁄ect on workers. As is explained in Appendix E we chose
the parameter values such that the share of FDI is about 20%. If the share of FDI is higher, it takes
less time for the unproductive production to be eliminated, and the resulting welfare gain is higher.
346 Final Remarks
We have developed a model of capital account liberalization under domestic and inter-
national borrowing constraints in which workers and entrepreneurs might not bene￿t
from ￿nancial integration as long as the domestic ￿nancial system is underdeveloped.
If wage suppression is dominant with underdeveloped domestic ￿nancial system, then
the liberalization leads to a deterioration of TFP and long-run stagnation. If interest
rate suppression is more pronounced, then the liberalization causes capital out￿ ow and
signi￿cant loss of employment during the adjustment. The reason for which capital ac-
count liberalization generates these costly adjustments is because under underdeveloped
￿nancial system funds are used by unproductive entrepreneurs and producers located in
foreign countries rather than productive domestic entrepreneurs.
Our logic might extend to ￿nancial liberalization across regions or di⁄erent segments
of the economy. For example, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004) ￿nd that the regions
with better local ￿nancial system in Italy enjoy better economic performance after the
￿nancial liberalization of the mid-1980s as they have more entries of new ￿rms, smaller
monopoly markup, and higher growth.30
Of course, an important remained question would be to examine how to improve the
domestic ￿nancial system.
30Reinhart and Rogo⁄ (2008) argue that the subprime mortgages could be interpreted as lending to
developing countries, because those loans are directed to the "under-developed" segment of the U.S
economy. Then, the ￿nancial liberalization of this segment may fail to improve the resource allocation
in the long-run unless the ￿nancial system within this segment is improved..
35Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1:
From (27) and (28); we learn there are three possible types of the equilibrium:
(i) Unproductive entrepreneurs produce (L0 > 0; r =
￿
w)
(ii) Unproductive entrepreneurs do not produce and productive entrepreneurs are











Let us now examine each type of equilibrium in turn in order to derive the necessary
and su¢ cient condition on the parameters for such equilibrium to exist.
A.1 Autarky equilibrium with ine¢ cient production:

















For employment of unproductive entrepreneurs to be positive, we need from goods mar-














) = X[X + ￿(1 + n)] ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿
[(1 ￿ ￿)X + n￿] = 0: (A.4)
Because F(0;
￿￿￿








Thus, we verify the condition (13) that guarantees that workers do not save in the
neighborhood of the steady state equilibrium. Also, we learn the condition for ine¢ cient








￿ + (1 + n)￿
￿ ￿: (A.5)
From (A:4); X and w are increasing functions of ￿; and r is a decreasing function of ￿.
A.2 Autarky equilibrium with e¢ cient production and credit
constrained productive entrepreneurs:
Here, because there is no employment by the unproductive entrepreneurs (L0 = 0) and














37Together with (31) - (33), we learn
X = ￿
1 ￿ (1 + n)￿
￿
: (A.6)
Then, we learn the productive entrepreneurs earn extra return X > 0 so that they are





Also we learn r = 1=[￿(1 + X)] < 1=￿, which veri￿es (13).
A.3 Autarky equilibrium in which no one is constrained:
If, ￿ ￿ 1=(1 + n); then we learn
X = 0; r = 1=￿; w = ￿￿; and s =
n
1 + n
satisfy all the equilibrium conditions of the steady state autarky equilibrium in which
none of the entrepreneurs are credit constrained. (See footnote 13). Concerning the
quantities, we have L0 = 0 and:
L = L
s(￿￿) = Z=￿:
Q:E:D: of Proposition 1.
38B Proof of Proposition 2
From the generic equilibrium conditions, (16) - (18) and (21) - (25), the steady state
equilibrium of the open economy is characterized by (r;w;x;X;L;L0;Z) that satis￿es











0 = 0; (B.7)
L =
￿XZ


















￿ ￿ wr + ￿￿￿r￿r￿
r￿
wr ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿r￿r￿
r￿
: (B.10)
B.1 Wage suppression: ￿ < ￿1
Lemma 3 : r > r￿ for ￿ < ￿1:
Proof. Suppose not. Then, from (8), we learn r = r￿: Then we have
r
a > r
￿ = r; for ￿ < ￿1;
by construction of ￿1. Then, from (32); we learn
X
a < X:




























= ￿￿ [1 + X + ￿￿(X
￿ ￿ X)]: (B.11)
where 1 + X￿ = 1=￿r￿: Then from (B:10); we learn
x = (￿ ￿ ￿)
1 + ￿￿X￿￿X
1+X
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)￿￿X￿￿X
1+X
:
Thus from (33), we have
e F(X;￿;￿) ￿ X[X + ￿(1 + n)] ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿
[(1 ￿ ￿)X + n￿ + ￿￿(X
￿ ￿ X)(X + n￿)] = 0:
Then we see X0(￿) > 0, or r0(￿) < 0. Also because e F(X;￿;￿) < F(X;
￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿) for
X 2 (0;X￿); we learn X > Xa, or r(￿) < ra(￿). Then from (B:11) and Proposition
1, we learn w(￿) > wa(￿). We can also verify that L0 > 0 from (B.8) and (B.9) under
Lemma 3.
40B.2 Interest rate suppression: ￿ 2 [￿1;￿2]
Lemma 4 L0 = 0 for ￿ 2 (￿1;￿2)
Proof. By de￿nition of (￿1;￿2); we know r(￿) ￿ r￿ > ra (￿) for ￿ 2 (￿1;￿2). Thus
X < Xa, or
x =










































Thus from (17); we learn L0 = 0 for ￿ 2 (￿1;￿2).
Lemma 5 r = r￿ for ￿ 2 (￿1;￿2)

























1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)X
:
Also from (33), we know
x = X
X + (1 + n)￿
(1 ￿ ￿)X + n￿
:
41Therefore we learn
0 = (1 ￿ ￿￿)[(1 ￿ ￿)X + n￿] ￿ [X + (1 + n)￿][1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)X]
= (1 + X)f￿(1 ￿ ￿)X ￿ ￿ [1 ￿ ￿ ￿ n￿(1 ￿ ￿)]g, or
X = ￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ n￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿(1 ￿ ￿)
:
Because from equation (A.6) we know ￿2 satis￿es X￿ = ￿
1￿(1+n)￿2
￿2 , we learn that
X > ￿
1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ n￿2(1 ￿ ￿)
￿2(1 ￿ ￿)
> X
￿; for ￿ < ￿2:
This contradicts r > r￿ because r = 1
￿(1+X).
Lemma 5 implies X = X￿ = 1
￿r ￿ 1. Then from (33) and (B:9), we know
x = X
￿ X￿ + (1 + n)￿
(1 ￿ ￿)X￿ + n￿
=
￿￿(1 + X￿) ￿ w






￿￿[X￿ + (1 + n)￿] ￿ ￿
X￿ + n￿
￿
= ￿￿[1 + X
￿k(X
￿)(￿ ￿ ￿2)] = w(￿), where
k (X
￿) ￿
X￿ + (1 + n)￿
X￿ + n￿
:
Lemma 4, 5, (B:8) and (29) implies
Z = ￿[1 + k(X
￿)(￿ ￿ ￿2]L
s (￿￿ [1 + X
￿k(X
￿)(￿ ￿ ￿2]):






1 ￿ X￿k(X￿)(￿ ￿ ￿2)
1 + k(X￿)(￿ ￿ ￿2)
:
where the LHS is the elasticity of labour supply.
B.3 Advanced Domestic Financial System: ￿ > ￿2
Lemma 6 L0 = 0 for ￿ > ￿2.











x = (￿ ￿ ￿)
1 + ￿￿X￿￿X
1+X
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)￿￿X￿￿X
1+X
:
Thus from (33), we learn X > X￿ for ￿ > ￿2 > ￿1. This contradicts r > r￿ for ￿ > ￿2.















where the strict inequality implies r = r￿ while r > r￿ implies the equality.
The equilibrium with r = r￿ implies
w = ￿￿ [1 + X
￿k(X
￿)(￿ ￿ ￿2)]
43Then from (B:12); r = r￿ if and only if






￿ + ￿￿[n￿ + (1=￿r￿) ￿ 1]
(1 + n)￿ + (1=￿r￿) ￿ 1
:
If ￿ > e ￿, we learn r > r￿ and thus from (B:12);





1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)X
and
X = ￿




Q:E:D: of the Proposition 2.
C Welfare computation
Since consumption ci
t is proportional to his net worth of date t, zi




t = (1 ￿ ￿)z
i
t











t is the gross rate of return on saving of entrepreneur i: The level of ri
t is equal
to rt when he is unproductive, and is equal to (1 + xt)rt when he is productive at date
























1 ￿ ￿ ￿




is the transition matrix for the productivity shift, and













are the vectors of the log rate of return for the productive and unproductive entrepreneurs
in the liberalization and in the autarky regimes respectively. Index [￿]j denotes the j
column in matrix [￿] in equation (C.13) and it identi￿es the type of entrepreneurs (j = 1
for productive and j = 2 for unproductive) at t = 0 when the liberalization occurs. Since
entrepreneurs can shift from the productive to the unproductive status, we will need to
distinguish two groups depending on the productivity at the time of liberalization.
For workers we have that since workers￿ s consumption is equal to wage income (ct =
wtlt = w
1+￿




















45D Tax and Subsidy
With production subsidy, the behaviour of the unproductive entrepreneurs is modi￿ed
from (10) to:
r












Term ￿(1 + ￿t)=wt represents the rate of return of the unproductive agents without
borrowing, which is the relevant return in the case of interest-rate suppression. The
employment of the productive entrepreneurs is modi￿ed from (16) to
Lt ￿
￿stZt
wt ￿ ￿[￿￿ ￿ ￿t]=r￿ ￿ [￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿=rt]
; (D.16)
and equality holds if
R(￿) =
￿(1 ￿ ￿)
wt ￿ ￿[￿￿ ￿ ￿t]=r￿ ￿ [￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿=rt]
> rt:
The denominator of RHS is downpayment for unit labor input, when the productive
entrepreneur borrows ￿(￿￿￿￿t)=r￿ from foreigners and ￿(1￿￿)￿=rt from domestic lead
creditor for unit labor cost. This expression shows that taxation crowds out investment
because it decreases collateral that can be used for private borrowing.
Since there is no government expenditure and no government bond, the goods market
clearing condition (19) is not a⁄ected. The extra rate of return by the productive





￿[1 ￿ ￿￿]=rt + ￿[￿￿ ￿ ￿t]=r￿ ￿ wt
wt ￿ ￿[￿￿ ￿ ￿t]=r￿ ￿ [￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿=rt]
: (D.17)
The competitive equilibrium with government policy is de￿ned recursively by (wt, rt, xt,
46Lt, L0
t, ￿t, st+1, Zt+1, B￿
t+1) as functions of the state variables (st;Zt;) that satisfy (18),
(19), (22) (23), (25), (37), (D:15), (D:16), and (D:17), for a given policy ￿t.
E Parameter Values in Section 4 and 5
We choose our parameters values such that one period in our model corresponds to a
year. The discount factor, ￿, is set 0.92: this implies that the steady state interest
rate under autarky ranges from 0% to 8.1% depending on the value of ￿ under which
unproductive agents produce. Note that in a credit constrained economy, the steady
state interest rate is lower than the inverse of the time preference rate.
￿ represents the Frish elasticity of labor supply. Micro studies estimate a low elasticity
ranging from 0.1 to 0.4 (MaCurdi 1981), at 0.7 (Hall, 2009), at 1 (Kimball and Shapiro,
2008) and at 1.5 (Gourio and Noual, 2007) while macroeconomic models usually use
higher values: for instance, King and Rebelo (1999) in their survey of RBC models use
an elasticity of 4 in their basic model and an in￿nite elasticity in an extension of their
model. New Keynesian models also use a high elasticity: Rotemberg and Woodford
(1998) and Woodford (2003) use an elasticity close to 9. Since our results are not too
sensitive to ￿, we set the elasticity to 3 lower than the value typically used in macro
models but higher than what micro studies would suggest.
In order to characterize the gap between the productivity of productive and un-
productive agents we use as a reference microeconometric studies that have measured
￿rm-level productivity. Syverson (2004) computes labor productivity measure for 443
four-digit industries using plant-level data from the 1977 Census of Manufactures (CM)
for the U.S. Once we focus on the interquartile range as a proxy for the gap between more
productive and less productive ￿rm we have that the ratio of labor productivity between
47the 75th and 25th percentile plants is about 1.3 (Syverson, 2004), slightly higher than
the one that we use to parametrize our economy where we set ￿ = 1:2 and ￿ = 1:05.
Parameters n and ￿ are set to 0.1 and 0.15, respectively. This implies that in the
steady state the fraction of the productive agents is equal to n/(1+n)=0.09, and the
expected time that an agent continues to be productive is 1/￿ = 6.66 years. Finally,
those parameters together imply that the unproductive agents produce in the autarky
steady state when ￿ is less than 0.64
We choose the foreign interest rate to be at 4% on a yearly basis which is a quite
standard in the real business cycle literature (see Schmitt-Grohe·and Uribe, 2003). The
value of the parameter that determines the tightness of the international constraint, ￿;
is set to 0:5 so that foreigners can obtain half of the output compared to the domestic
lead creditor. In a framework with only international borrowing constraint, Mendoza
(2001) sets ￿ = 0:74 so that his model-economy is likely to hit the borrowing limit. We
choose a lower value so that the possibility of hitting the constraint is reduced but our
analysis is robust to changes in ￿:
In parametrizing the economy with the FDI sector, we set the curvature of the
matching function ￿ to 0.3, in between the value of 0.24 reported in Hall (2005) and
0.36 estimated in Cooper, Haltiwanger and Willis (2007) and the productivity of the
FDI sector, ￿￿ is set to be 1:5 so that foreign productivity is 25% higher than produc-
tivity in domestic ￿rms, which is a plausible value given the degree of heterogeneity in
productivity even in more industrialized countries. The other parameters c, ￿ and 1￿￿
are chosen as to match the size of the FDI sector in the overall economy to a level of
about 20%. (Lankes and Stern (1999) report that the share of FDI in￿ ows over GDP
in 1996 for emerging market economies ranges between 1% to 19% so that given the
current expansion of FDI ￿ ows 20% seems a reasonable value for the size of FDI). In
48doing so we obtain that c = 0:2; ￿ = 0:15 and 1￿￿ = 0:4 which is higher than the value
of 0.1for 1￿￿ estimated by Shimer (2005) for the U.S. economy. The dynamics reported
in Section 5 is robust against changing those parameters. As long as the implied share
of FDI is kept at about 20%, the transition dynamics is very similar.
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